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This article examines the long-run effects of the Restart unemploy-
ment program in the United Kingdom. The program, aimed at the
long-term unemployed, involved a combination of tighter monitoring
of benefit eligibility rules and increased job search assistance. We
compare the employment behavior of a treatment group who par-
ticipated in the scheme with that of a randomly chosen control group
for whom participation was delayed. While there is little evidence of
a long-term benefit for women, the unemployment rate among males
in the treatment group was six percentage points lower than that of
the control group 5 years after the initial experiment.
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I. Introduction
In recent years many countries have introduced unemployment insur-
ance reforms in an attempt to curb rising levels of unemployment. These
reforms often combine stricter “work-search” tests, stipulating minimum
levels of job search, and greater provision of job search assistance for the
unemployed. However, very little is known about the long-term em-
ployment effects of these reforms. Given the absence of suitable long-
run data, evaluations to date have tended to focus on the impact of these
reforms on the unemployment spell in progress at the time of the study.1
However, the short-run success of a program may provide a misleading
indication of its cost-effectiveness if those who exit return to unemploy-
ment soon afterward.
In this article we use administrative data on individuals’ monthly labor
market status, matched with data from a controlled experiment, to evaluate
the long-term effects of the U.K. Restart unemployment program. The
Restart program consists of a compulsory interview for the long-term
unemployed with an official of the Employment Office. The aim of the
program is to reduce welfare dependency. The Restart process combines
counseling and encouragement with tighter enforcement of the conditions
necessary to qualify for unemployment benefits (UB). Administrative data
is available for individuals for 5 years after they began participating in
the scheme. The availability of these data allow us to examine whether
the positive Restart effect identified in earlier work represents only a
short-run solution to the problem of unemployment or whether the pro-
gram improves the long-term prospects of the individuals involved.2
We examine the impact of Restart by comparing outcomes for a treat-
ment group with those of a randomly chosen control group for whom
participation in the process was postponed for 6 months. For females,
providing control group members with the interview 6 months later elim-
inates most of the initial gains received by the treatment group. In contrast,
the unemployment rate for males who participated in the Restart process
at the appointed time was six percentage points lower than for males in
the control group 5 years after the initial implementation of the experi-
ment. Our data allow us to distinguish between treatments who were
subjected only to the threat component of the program and those who
received job search assistance in addition. Our analysis suggests that the
threat component associated with being called for an interview may ac-
count for the short-run effects of the program, but the services provided
1 See Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), Decker (1994), and Gorter and Kalb
(1996).
2 For an analysis of the short-run effects of Restart, see Dolton and O’Neill
(1996).
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at the interview itself, such as job search assistance, may be important
determinants of the long-run effects.
II. The Unemployment Benefit System and
the Restart Program in 1989
To understand how Restart worked at this time, it is necessary to de-
scribe the U.K. welfare system.3 The Employment Service is the govern-
ment agency responsible for the administration and payment of unem-
ployment assistance. The main contributory benefit is unemployment
benefits. The individual’s right to this payment depends on his or her
participation in the national insurance scheme. The main noncontributory
benefits are Income Support, Family Credit (similar to the earned income
tax credit [EITC]), and Housing Benefit. To receive any of these benefits,
individuals must be available for and actively seeking work. The Un-
employment Benefit Offices (UBO) conduct individual assessments of
benefit eligibility, although prior to Restart these checks were not rig-
orously enforced. The Employment Service is also responsible for the
counseling and placement of the unemployed. These services are provided
through a network of “high-street” Jobcentres.
In response to increasing long-term unemployment the Restart program
was introduced nationally in April 1987.4 The process began with the
Restart office sending a letter to each individual approaching an unbroken
period of 6 months claiming assistance.5 This letter requested that the
individual attend an interview at a stated date and time. In some instances
individuals were excused attendance at the Restart interview mainly be-
cause they had already obtained a job or a place on a training program
or had withdrawn their benefit claim. The Restart interviews took place
in Employment Service Jobcentres and lasted approximately 15–25
minutes. If the individual remained unemployed, additional interviews
were held every 6 months. During the interview the counselor assessed
the claimant’s unemployment history, offered advice on benefits, job
search behavior, training courses, and in some cases initiated direct contact
with employers. For some individuals the Restart interview acted as a
3 While the goals of the Restart program in operation today are the same as
when it was introduced in 1987, the program has developed since its introduction.
Further details are available in a supplementary appendix available from the au-
thors upon request.
4 In 1987, when Restart was introduced, there were 1.3 million individuals who
had been out of work for over a year. This corresponds to over 40% of those
unemployed. The corresponding figure for 1979 was 25%.
5 A copy of the Restart office letter is available on-line at http:\\www.may.
ie\academic\economics\staff_page09a.html.
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stepping stone to other services such as Restart courses, Jobclubs, or
Employment Training.6
A further feature of the Restart program was the threat to reduce or
suspend a claimant’s welfare payments. Attendance at the Restart inter-
view is mandatory, and those who failed to attend the initial appointment
were sent two more letters requesting them to do so. If they still had not
attended an interview by the time of the third letter, their names were
flagged at the UBO. They were then required to attend a Restart interview
and to return with evidence of having done so before they were allowed
to receive UB again.7 In 1988–89 over 2.3 million Restart interviews were
conducted at a cost of approximately £38 million.
III. The Experimental Design
The use of controlled experiments has been advocated as a means of
overcoming sample selection problems inherent in evaluations of labor
market programs (see, e.g., LaLonde 1986). In 1989 the Employment
Service conducted an experiment to evaluate the impact of Restart. This
study identified a sample of individuals approaching their sixth month of
unemployment in the period March–July 1989 who were therefore eligible
for the first in a series of Restart interviews. A random sample of 8,925
of these individuals was chosen to take part in the study. Individuals were
retained in the sample even if they subsequently did not attend a scheduled
interview. Thus, the sample is one of the inflow to Restart and not the
outflow from it.
Individuals were selected for the sample on the basis of their National
Insurance (NI) numbers. From this sample a control group of 582 people
was randomly chosen. Members of the control group, although eligible
for an interview, were not asked to attend. If they were still unemployed
6 months later, they were then brought into the Restart process. It must
be stressed that the nature of our experiment is a partial one, in that it
does not permanently exclude control groups from receiving the treatment
but merely delays its receipt for 6 months. This is in direct contrast to
most experimental settings, which involve the control group never re-
ceiving the treatment. Hence our experimental design permits an evalu-
ation of the impact of postponing search assistance and work search tests
by 6 months. This design also permits a test of whether unemployment
leads to more unemployment, that is, a test of state dependence versus
6 For more information on these and the other facilities provided by the Em-
ployment Service, see Disney et al. (1992).
7 The threat component of Restart tended to be played down in official publicity.
However, data supplied by the Department of Social Security show that between
July and September 1989, approximately 272,000 adjudication officer decisions were
made. In 57% of these cases the individual’s payment was stopped.
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heterogeneity. By design the only difference between the experiments and
the controls is that members of the control group must have experienced
an additional 6 months of unemployment before receiving the treatment.
Any long-run difference between these two groups, therefore, reflects the
impact of this extra unemployment on future unemployment.
The structure of the sample was such that it could also be linked to
the Joint Unemployment and Vacancies Operating System (JUVOS) data
collected by the Employment Service. The JUVOS data provide monthly
administrative records of a claimant’s employment status, which are free
from recall and nonresponse bias. The data we use result in unemployment
histories dating from January 1982 up until May 1994, 5 years after par-
ticipation in the Restart experiment. Such long-term data are rare in an
experimental setting and facilitate a detailed examination of the long-run
effects of Restart.8
While the administrative data permit a long-run analysis of Restart,
they do not identify the destination on leaving the UB register—it may
be exit to employment, a training program, or simply signing off claiming
assistance. To supplement the administrative data we use survey data,
which are available for a shorter time period for approximately 60% of
the original sample. These data contain self-reported work histories for
each individual that distinguish between alternative exit states. The time
line shown in figure A1 illustrates the timing of each stage of the Restart
experiment.
Summary statistics for members of both the control and treatment
groups with valid unemployment data are given in table A1. Statistics are
provided for both the full sample and the restricted sample of individuals
who replied to the survey questionnaire. We find no significant differences
in the characteristics of the full and restricted samples. The average
monthly unemployment rates for each group for the 7 years preceding
the implementation of the experiment are also given in table A1. If the
random assignment was successful, there should be no difference between
the treatment and control groups during this period. A comparison of
the unemployment rates in table A1 suggests that this was so for both
the full and the restricted samples.9
8 Studies by Couch (1992) and Friedlander and Hamilton (1996) also provide a
long-run analysis of labor market programs in an experimental setting.
9 It has been argued that flaws in the design of experiments can lead to misleading
results (see, e.g., Heckman and Smith 1995). Several features of the design of the
Restart experiment help reduce the likelihood of biased results. Every Employment
Service office throughout Britain was contacted while constructing the sample, and
there was no scope for local employment offices to opt out of the Restart experiment.
This is in contrast to the voluntary nature of the Job Training Partnership Act
experiments cited by Heckman and Smith. Having discussed the Restart scheme
with members of the Employment Service, it is also our belief that at this time the
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IV. The Long-Run Effects of Restart
Using data from the controlled experiment, one can estimate the av-
erage effect of Restart by comparing the average unemployment rates
for both groups. Figure 1a plots the monthly unemployment rates for
both the treatment group and the control group over the 12-year period
for which we have data.10 Figure 1b provides the same information in
a different format, by tracing the difference in unemployment rates
between control and treatment groups. The first vertical line at April
1989 corresponds to the date at which initial Restart letters were sent
to those in the treatment group, while the second vertical line, 6 months
later, represents the date at which control group members were given
their first Restart interview.
These data show that unemployment rates for both groups were very
similar in the months prior to the start of the experiment, rising to a high
of 40% in September 1987. The fall in the unemployment rate in 1987
reflects the general improvement in the U.K economy at this time. In the
months preceding the receipt of the Restart letter, the unemployment rate
for both groups rose to 100% because, in order to qualify for the Restart
program, individuals must have been unemployed for the previous 6
months.
Comparing the unemployment rates after April 1989 provides an es-
timate of the Restart effect. In the 6 months following the initial Restart
interview, the unemployment rate for the treatment group was 10 per-
centage points lower than that of the control group, reflecting the con-
trol group’s exclusion from the Restart process over this period. This
gap closed when control group members entered the process, falling to
only one percentage point about 6 months after the control group had
received their interviews. However, over the next year, a six-percentage-
point gap reemerged and was maintained for the remaining 3 years of
the sample.11
As well as illustrating the long-run effects of the Restart treatment,
these findings also provide evidence of state dependence. Offering the
same services to two groups of individuals who, by design, are identical,
except that members of the control group may have been unemployed
for 6 months longer when they received the assistance, results in sub-
stantially different outcomes for both groups
Figure 2a and b repeats the above analysis separately for males and
Restart program was not sufficiently well known for UB claimants to anticipate
receipt of the interview. For a detailed discussion of the use of social experiments
in evaluating labor market programs, see Heckman, LaLonde, and Smith (1999).
10 Throughout this article we calculate the unemployment rate in a given month
as the proportion of the sample claiming assistance in that month.
11 This gap is statistically significant at the 5% level. Confidence intervals are
omitted from the diagram for clarity.
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Fig. 1.—a, Unemployment rates in treatment and control groups. b, Difference in unem-
ployment rates between the control and treatment groups.
females. In both cases a gap emerges during the period in which the control
group was excluded from the process. This gap declines when control
group members receive their first interview. However, there is a striking
difference in what happens after this point. For males, the gap reemerges
so that the unemployment rate in the treatment group is six percentage
points lower than in the control group 5 years after the experiment. In
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Fig. 2.—a, Difference in unemployment rates for males in the control and treatment groups.
b, Difference in unemployment rates for females in the control and treatment groups.
contrast, for females there is no evidence that Restart has a substantial
long-run effect. The gap becomes statistically insignificant when control
group members receive their interview and remains so throughout the
remainder of the sample. We now examine some possible explanations of
these results.
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A. Benefit Threat or Job Search Assistance?
Since both the “carrot” and “stick” components of Restart were ad-
ministered simultaneously, we cannot directly identify their individual
effects. This drawback is not unique to Restart. As noted by Meyer in
his survey of U.S. labor market experiments, “the [U.S.] experiments make
it difficult to determine which treatments are likely to be most successful,
as most were a combination of services and enforcement” (1995, p. 128).
There are a small number of experiments carried out in the United States
that attempt to examine the relative importance of enhanced placement
services and work search requirements in reducing unemployment du-
rations (see, e.g., Corson and Nicholson 1985; Corson et al. 1989; and
Johnson and Klepinger 1994).
In the Charleston Demonstration (Corson and Nicholson 1985) and
the Washington Experiment (Johnson and Klepinger 1994) different com-
binations of eligibility checks and job search assistance were assigned to
different treatment groups to examine their relative importance. However,
in some cases it appears that the letter inviting claimants to the job search
seminar was perceived as an eligibility check rather than an offer of job
search assistance, thus making it difficult to distinguish between the two
types of treatment. In their analyses Johnson and Klepinger conclude that
it was the receipt of the letter rather than actual participation at the seminar
that resulted in people signing off. Thus, it seems that the perceived threat
effects may have been important even for individuals scheduled only for
job search assistance.
An interesting feature of our survey data that enables us to get some
insight into the relative importance of the two components is that almost
20% of the treatment group did not attend a Restart interview. These
individuals could not have benefited from the improved placement services
and were therefore only subjected to the threat component of Restart.
To examine whether these individuals are driving our findings, we repeated
the analysis, excluding them from the treatment group. The results are
presented in figure 3. In contrast to the previous results, we find no
significant difference between the unemployment rates of the treatment
and control groups during the period in which the control group was
excluded from the process. This suggests that most of the short-run impact
of Restart may result from the threat effect associated with the tighter
eligibility checks outlined in the initial call to the Restart interview.12
However, there is still a significant long-run Restart effect in these data.
This suggests that the services received by these individuals at the inter-
12 These results are likely to overstate the importance of the threat effect since
presumably some of the treatment group members who did not attend the interview
found work naturally during this period for reasons unrelated to the Restart process.
Unfortunately, there is nothing we can do to identify these individuals in our data.
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Fig. 3.—Difference in unemployment rates between all control group members and treat-
ment group members who received an interview.
view, such as improved job search assistance, enhanced placement services,
or improved access to other government services, may be important de-
terminants of the long-run effects we identified earlier.13
Differences in the experimental designs almost certainly explain part of
the differences between the results we obtain and the conclusions reached
by researchers in the Washington Experiment. However, it is also likely
that part of the explanation is due to differences in the nature of un-
employment in the United States and United Kingdom. While unem-
ployment rates were systematically lower in the United States (7.1%) than
the United Kingdom (10.7%) over this period, the inflow rate into un-
employment was actually lower in the United Kingdom (1.4% per month)
than in the United States (2.3% per month). The difference in unem-
ployment rates is accounted for by differences in the outflow rate from
unemployment. In 1988 the average completed duration of unemployment
spells in the United Kingdom was 8 months compared to less than 3
13 When we examine restricted samples from within the treatment group, we risk
losing the randomness provided by the initial experiment. However, we do not
believe that this is driving the above results. We have looked at the characteristics
of the restricted treatment group and found that they are quite similar to both the
full treatment group and the control group. For example, the difference in unem-
ployment rates for the restricted group and the control group averaged over the 6
years prior to the Restart experiment was less than one half of one percentage point.
This is negligible when compared with the six-percentage-point differential observed
in the final 4 years of our data.
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Table 1
Self-Reported Destination States of Sample Members for the Final Quarter of
1989 (%)
Destination States
Full-Time
Work
Part-Time
Work
Out of
Labor Force
Claiming
Assistance
Male treatment group 22 10 10 46
Male control group 20 7 16 48
Female treatment group 15 25 25 26
Female control group 15 22 26 31
months in the United States. The average duration of uncompleted spells
in both countries was 24 months and 3 months, respectively.14 There is
also evidence that the search behavior of unemployed workers in both
countries differed substantially during this period. Newly unemployed
people in Britain made only three job applications per month, on average,
in 1987 compared to eight for their counterparts in the United States.15
These comparisons suggest that programs aimed at enhancing placement
services, improving job search assistance, and maintaining contact with
the labor market may potentially be more effective in the United Kingdom
than in the United States.
B. Timing and Gender Effects
As mentioned earlier, the gap between the unemployment rates of the
males in the control group and all males in the treatment group reemerged
in 1991 after having being eliminated when the control group workers
entered the process. For women there is no evidence of a long-run effect.
While it is difficult, given our data, to identify the precise reasons for
these effects, some potential explanations emerge when we use the survey
data to distinguish between exit states for these groups. Table 1 provides
a detailed breakdown of the destinations of sample members for the last
quarter of 1989. The top portion refers to males, while the bottom portion
shows the results for females.
Looking at the results for males, we see that while the proportion
claiming assistance over this period is similar for both groups, important
differences emerge when we look at other destination states. If we measure
inactivity as either “claiming assistance” or being “out of the labor force,”
we find that 64% of the members of the control group were inactive in
the months following the control group interview compared to only 56%
for the treatment group. It is clear from this that treatment group members
are less likely to experience a loss of human capital through disuse and
14 Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), p. 223.
15 Layard et al. (1991), p. 276.
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are less likely to be stigmatized than members of the control group, many
more of whom have left the labor force. The effects of these differences
are likely to emerge later if labor market conditions change. This seems
to be the case in 1991 when the U.K. economy entered a recession. Our
long-run results indicate that individuals who received the treatment were
more able to cope with the adverse labor market conditions that prevailed
at the beginning of the 1990s.
The results presented for women in the bottom panel suggest that
distinguishing between exit states may also provide part of the explanation
of the gender differences. For most households it is still the case that the
responsibility for child care falls disproportionately on the female partner.
Under these circumstances it seems likely that a significant proportion of
women who were initially claiming assistance may not have been available
for or willing to take up full-time employment. When confronted by the
Restart officer, many females may choose to sign off and leave the labor
force rather than enter full-time employment. This seems to be the case
in our data, irrespective of when the interview was received. Only 26%
of women in the treatment group were still signing on in this period
compared to 46% of men in the treatment group. However, in contrast
to males, approximately one-quarter of females left the labor force al-
together.16 We have examined this issue formally in earlier work (Dolton
and O’Neill 1996). In that paper we estimated a competing risks model
of unemployment duration, distinguishing between exits out of the labor
force and exits into a job. The results of that analysis also show that
people who exited the labor force were much more likely to be women,
while men were significantly more likely to exit unemployment into a
job.
The other striking feature that emerges from this analysis is the number
of women who exited into part-time jobs. The proportion of women in
part-time jobs is almost three times larger than the corresponding figure
for men. Given the number of women who exit the labor force or enter
part-time jobs, it would appear that the employment expectations and
potential for skill development among women in the treatment group
may have been lower than for similar males. This reduces the benefits of
early treatment for women attending Restart and may explain the lower
long-run effects of the program for women. It is important to note that
this explanation relies on unobserved compositional differences between
males and females in the sample. It says nothing about the effectiveness
16 We have further evidence of this from the Restart interviews that we sat in on.
In some of those interviews female workers declared themselves available for work.
However, when pressed further by the Restart officer, some of these women ad-
mitted that they would only be able to work very restrictive hours.
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Fig. 4.—Unemployment hazards for the control and treatment groups
of the program for two individuals identical in every respect other than
gender.
C. Employment or Reemployment Effects?
The results so far clearly indicate that Restart had a significant effect
on unemployment rates. In steady state we can write the unemployment
rate as the ratio of the “inflow rate” (the rate at which people leave
employment for unemployment) and the “outflow rate” (the rate at which
people leave unemployment for employment). Hence, Restart may reduce
unemployment rates either because it helps people find jobs quicker or
because it helps employed participants keep their new jobs longer. We
can examine the impact of Restart on unemployment duration (beyond
the initial 6 months) by plotting the exit hazard for the treatment and
the control groups.17 The results shown in figure 4 reveal negative duration
dependence for both groups. Furthermore, we note the striking difference
in the hazard functions for the control and treatment group in the 5–6
months following the initial Restart interview. In particular, we see that
over the period in which the control group was excluded from the process,
members of this group were only 70%–80% as likely to exit unemploy-
17 In this analysis the reference point (duration equals one) corresponds to the
seventh month of unemployment, since by construction all our samples have been
unemployed for at least 6 months.
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ment as members of the treatment group.18 We also notice a significant
spike in the hazard functions approximately 6 months after the start of
the experiment, which is consistent with attendance at the Restart inter-
view at 12 months of unemployment. The fact that the spike is more
pronounced for the control group is consistent with this being the first
meeting with the Restart counselor.
To examine the impact of Restart on reemployment duration, we must
allow for the possibility that the duration of unemployment affects future
reemployment duration.19 To allow for this, we need to control for initial
unemployment durations when examining the reemployment durations.
However, we cannot simply condition on initial unemployment duration
in the reemployment hazard. The fact that Restart affects the duration of
unemployment may remove the comparability between the control and
treatment groups in any equation that holds unemployment duration con-
stant. If Restart affects the probability of employment, then other things
being equal, we are more likely to observe an employment spell for treat-
ment group members than for control group members. If there is heter-
ogeneity within groups, then it is likely that the employed treatments will
have inferior characteristics than employed controls, contaminating the
comparability of the groups. We allow for the possibility of dynamic sample
selection bias by estimating a bivariate duration model, including the du-
ration of unemployment as an explanatory variable in the reemployment
duration equation, while also controlling for possible correlation in the
error structure. In particular, we assume that the relationship between un-
employment and reemployment durations can be written as follows:
′ln t p aX  u u u
′ln t p b Z  g ln t   ,e e u e
where tu is the duration of the initial unemployment spell, te is the duration
of the subsequent reemployment spell, X and Z are vectors of explanatory
variables that are described in detail in appendix A, and eu and ee are error
terms that we assume are jointly normal distributed.20
The estimation results presented in table 2 indicate that the correlation
coefficient, r, is statistically insignificant. This implies that the duration of
the most recent unemployment spell can be treated as exogenous for the
purpose of estimating the reemployment equation. This suggests that dy-
18 We have estimated confidence intervals for these hazard functions that support
the differences discussed in the text. However, for the sake of clarity we have not
included them in the figure.
19 Some examples of this are provided in Heckman and Borjas (1980) or Belzil
(1995).
20 The model is described in more detail in app. B.
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Table 2
Bivariate Unemployment-Reemployment Estimates (Standard Errors
in Parentheses)
Variables Unemployment Equation Reemployment Equation
Constant 1.59*
(.05)
2.08*
(.22)
Control .25*
(.07)
.03
(.08)
Male .20*
(.04)
.18*
(.05)
Age 1 35 .09*
(.04)
.11*
(.04)
Inner City .25*
(.04)
.04
(.06)
Past Unemp. .42*
(.06)
.20*
(.09)
U˙1 5.15*
(.82)
U˙2 .89*
(.44)
Log tu .06
(.16)
Parameters:
ju 1.20*
(.01)
je 1.10*
(.02)
r .06
(.17)
* Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
namic sample selection bias is not a problem in this Restart experiment.21
Furthermore, our earlier conclusions are not affected by the more detailed
modeling of the process. Members of the control group have significantly
longer spells of unemployment, while reemployment durations are not
significantly different between the two groups.22 From this it would appear
21 The Restart interview itself is if of short duration and as such does not really
interrupt the unemployment spell. In this respect Restart is similar to the JTPA-
CT program analyzed by Eberwein, Ham, and LaLonde (1997), in which dynamic
sample selection bias did not appear to be a serious issue. Furthermore, since we
have 5 years of follow-up data, a large proportion of both samples (94%) experience
an employment spell during this period. This would further reduce the likely impact
of selection bias. We are grateful to Robert LaLonde for helpful comments on these
issues.
22 In estimating the model, we also control for local unemployment conditions,
sex, age, living in an inner city, and previous unemployment histories. These esti-
mated coefficients tend to have the expected signs. We find some evidence of a
scarring or stigma effect when we look at the total proportion of time spent un-
employed preceding the interview. Individuals with poor employment records prior
to Restart have significantly shorter reemployment spells. The extent to which this
reflects heterogeneity or true state dependence cannot be determined from our
results.
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Table 3
Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Restart Program (£; Standard Errors in
Parentheses)
Sex
Benefit Year
Interview
Costs
Jobclubs
Costs1 2 3 4 5
Male 101*
(44)
61
(69)
165*
(72)
247*
(72)
206*
(74)
15 110
Female 88
(53)
29
(70)
15
(68)
59
(67)
15
(63)
15 110
* Denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
that the program is most effective in reducing the spells of unemployment
duration rather than extending reemployment durations.
V. Cost-Benefit Analysis of Restart
While Restart may have significantly reduced unemployment rates
among the long-term unemployed, it is natural to ask what the cost of
these reductions was. In this section of the article we provide estimates
of the cost-effectiveness of Restart from the perspective of the UB sys-
tem.23 We include as benefits the estimated savings on UB payments over
our sample period. We calculate this as the average reduction in weeks
spent unemployed by the treatment group in each of the 5 years after the
experiment, multiplied by the average weekly UB payment, which we
estimate as £48 for men and £34 for women. We then calculate the present
value of these savings using a 10% discount rate. The yearly benefits are
given in the first five columns of table 3. The present value of savings for
men is £619, with the annual savings significant in each year except the
second. For women the estimated saving is £181, but none of the female
differences are statistically significant.
We measure the cost of Restart by looking at the administrative costs
of the program. The 1988–89 government’s public Expenditure White
Paper reported that 2.3 million Restart interviews were carried out in that
year at a cost of £38 milllion. This gives a cost per interview of £15. The
UB gains over and above the administrative costs of the interview are
clearly very large. However, as noted earlier, part of the Restart effect
may operate by channeling individuals into other services such as Restart
courses, Jobclubs, or training schemes. Our costs need to be adjusted to
include these services. The Expenditure White Paper estimates that ex-
penditures per Restart course in 1988–89 were £100 per place and £120
per Jobclubs place. Since Restart courses and Jobclubs cater to a different
23 Throughout our study we restrict our attention to the direct benefits associated
with lower unemployment rates. There may be indirect benefits such as reductions
in crime and improvements in health. Unfortunately, we have no way of quantifying
these effects in our study.
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clientele, it is unlikely that the same individual would use both services.
We assume an equal split between programs, resulting in a per capita cost
of £110. Making the conservative assumption that all members who went
through the Restart process were placed as a result of attendance at one
of these advisory programs,24 we obtain an estimated net gain of £494 for
men and £56 for women. Since many of the women exited the labor force,
it is reasonable to assume that they would not have used the advisory
centers. Possibly a better estimate of the net gain for women is the benefit
net of the interview cost, which is £166. However, as we mentioned earlier,
none of the yearly benefits for women are statistically significantly dif-
ferent from zero.25
Meyer (1995) reports cost-benefit analyses for many of the U.S pro-
grams. The average gain from these programs was $95. However, two of
these programs, the Washington exception reporting treatment and the
Nevada experiment, seem to be outliers. When these are excluded, the
average gain is $27. In this context our estimated gain of £494 for males
seems large. This is even more so when we recall that our restart exper-
iment is only pure for the first 6 months of the experiment. After this,
our treatment effects are measured relative to a group that received a
delayed treatment. The results reported in this section, therefore, are likely
to underestimate the program effects relative to a situation in which the
control never received the treatment. Against this, however, is the fact
that the U.S. estimates only measure benefits in the first year after the
program. If we restrict our findings to the same time span, we obtain a
net loss of £24. If we relax the assumption that all males are placed through
Jobclubs or Restart courses, we obtain a short run gain of £86, which is
larger than the U.S. result but smaller than the estimated long-run gain.
Our cost-benefit analysis takes no account of the extra benefits in the
form of higher wages or taxes once our claimants begin to work or the
extra cost associated with the deadweight and displacement effects. If
members of the treatment group gained employment at the expense of
workers not receiving the treatment (displacement), then our experimental
results are likely to overstate the impact of Restart on the entire economy.26
Such an outcome is more likely if the number of jobs available is fixed.
In this case, Restart may simply move people to the top of the job queue,
24 This overestimates the costs of Restart since some Restart participants will have
left the unemployment register simply because they did not satisfy the eligibility
checks.
25 Our estimates of the net gains of Restart do not make adjustments for attendance
at government-provided training schemes; 12% of the treatment group report at-
tending a government-training scheme, as opposed to 6% of the control group.
Unfortunately, we have no information on the training costs associated with Restart.
26 For a microanalysis of displacement in the context of experimental studies, see
Davidson and Woodbury (1993).
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either as a result of greater search intensity, tighter eligibility controls, or
because preferential attention is given to treatment group members by
Restart counselors. However, framing the argument in this way may be
misleading. The evidence on vacancies suggests that demand side con-
straints cannot explain all the rise in unemployment in the United King-
dom in this period (see, e.g., Layard et al. 1991) and that supply side
factors may have been important.
To avoid counselors’ manipulating the services in favor of the treatment
group (“creaming”), it would have been ideal if the Restart counselor had
not known the identity of those taking part in the experiment. We do
not believe that this was the case. Nevertheless, we are confident that
there was little scope for the Restart counselor to provide special attention
to members of the treatment group.27 In the survey data, treatment group
members were asked if they were offered a job that had been referred to
them by the counselor. Only 1% of the treatment group answered yes
to this question. Excluding these individuals from the analysis does not
alter any of the results in our article.
Finally, if displacement effects played an important role in explaining
our experimental findings, one would expect to see only small changes
in the aggregate unemployment rate following the introduction of Restart.
This does not seem to have been the case. Aggregate time-series studies
that analyze the impact of Restart support our findings.28
VI. Conclusion
In this article we examine the long-run impact of the Restart unem-
ployment program using experimental data in which members of a ran-
domly assigned control group were excluded from the Restart process
for 6 months. The presence of a control group helps identify the Restart
effect, while the availability of administrative data allows us to examine
the long-run effects of the program. We find that the combination of a
threat effect and job search assistance provides a cost-effective way of
reducing long-term unemployment in the United Kingdom. Individuals
who participated in the program experienced a reduction in time spent
27 White and Lakey (1992) note that “the PSI research team visited local offices
to observe Restart in operation. Our view based on this observation was that biased
treatment of those in the survey was unlikely. Those in the survey sample formed
a small part of a much larger caseload at any local office (about 1 in 100 of those
interviewed over a period). The pressures of the case-load in our view left little
scope for the Restart counselors to give special treatment to those in the survey
sample” (p. 16).
28 Disney et al. (1992) examine the impact of Restart using aggregate data on
unemployment flows and vacancies and conclude that Restart “accounts for a very
substantial part of the fall in long-term unemployment (during the late 1980’s)” (p.
238).
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unemployed in the short run. The initial gain experienced by females in
the treatment group is eliminated once the control group is brought into
the process. For men, however, providing the treatment to control group
members 6 months later failed to compensate them for their earlier losses.
Male members of the treatment group had unemployment rates that were
six percentage points lower than the control group 5 years after the initial
interview. These results are all the more remarkable when we note that
the experiment was a partial one that delayed participation of the controls
for 6 months rather than withholding the treatment altogether.
In examining the channels through which Restart operates, we found
that the threat component of Restart may have been important in gen-
erating the initial benefits of the program. However, in addition, the
services provided at the Restart interview played an important role in
generating the long-run effects we estimate. This has implications for
studies examining the importance of work-search tests relative to en-
hanced counseling. If the timing of benefits from alternative labor market
schemes differs, then short-run studies risk not only ignoring potential
gains but also doing so in a way that biases the evaluation.
Appendix A
Data Appendix: Variable Definitions
Controlp one if the person was not invited to receive an initial Restart
interview at 6 months of unemployment, and zero otherwise.
p percentage change in the local unemployment level in the 2U˙1
months preceding the start of the unemployment spell. This was calculated
using the National Online Information System data (NOMIS). The
NOMIS data contain monthly indicators of local labor market conditions
at the level of an individual’s travel-to-work area. Travel-to-work areas
approximate self-contained labor markets in that commuting to work
tends to occur within the boundary of the area. There are 380 travel-to-
work area defined in our data, and the local labor market conditions for
each of these areas are available over the period of our study.
p percentage change in the person’s local unemployment level inU˙2
the 2 months preceding the start of the reemployment spell, calculated
from the NOMIS data.
Male p one if individual was a male, zero otherwise.
if individual was aged over 35, zero otherwise.Age 1 35p one
Inner City p one if individual lived in an inner city, zero otherwise.
Past Unemp.p proportion of the individual working life between 1982
and the Restart interview that was spent in unemployment, calculated
from the JUVOS data.
Log tu p log of unemployment duration.
Fig. A1.—Timeline for restart experiment
Table A1
Summary Statistics (Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Variable Name
Full Sample Restricted Sample
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Male .70
(.005)
.73
(.019)
.03
(.02)
.68
(.007)
.70
(.026)
.02
(.03)
Age 1 35 .35
(.005)
.38
(.021)
.03
(.02)
.39
(.007)
.44
(.028)
.05
(.03)
Inner city .20
(.004)
.21
(.018)
.01
(.02)
.18
(.006)
.20
(.022)
.02
(.02)
Unemployment
rate:
1982 .22 .25 .03 .22 .22 .00
1983 .28 .29 .01 .27 .25 .02
1984 .31 .31 .00 .29 .29 .00
1985 .35 .35 .00 .33 .35 .02
1986 .38 .39 .01 .37 .40 .03
1987 .43 .43 .00 .41 .42 .01
Sample size 7,462 472 4,370 292
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Appendix B
The Bivariate Duration Model
To model the relationship between unemployment and subsequent em-
ployment, we specify a joint distribution for both random variables U
(unemployment) and E (reemployment). We denote this distribution by
fU, E(u, e). To derive the likelihood function for our sample, we distinguish
between three types of observations: (i) people for whom we observe
completed spells of unemployment and reemployment spells, (ii) people
whose unemployment spell is censored and thus have no reemployment
spell, and (iii) people whose unemployment spell is ended but who have
a censored employment spell. To capture the contribution of these in-
dividuals to the likelihood, we define: if neither spell is censored,c p one1
and zero otherwise, and if the unemployment spell is not cen-c p one2
sored, zero otherwise.
The likelihood function can then be written as
Lp c ln f (u, e)  (1 c ) ln 1 F (u)[ ] [ ] ( 1i U,E 2i U
i
 (1 c ) c ln 1 F (e) f (u) ,[ ]{ })1i 2i EFU U
which is maximized using standard nonlinear optimization techniques.
To do so we must specify a distribution function fU, E. We follow Belzil
(1995) in assuming a bivariate normal distribution. In particular, we as-
sume that the relationship between unemployment and reemployment fen
as follows:
′ln t p a X  u u u
′ln t p b Z  g ln t   ,e e u e
where we assume that the error terms are jointly normal distributed.
The system is identified by the inclusion of in the unemploymentU˙1
equation and by the inclusion of in the reemployment equation. BothU˙2
of these are exogenous variables computed using the linked NOMIS data
on the average local unemployment rates. Since all unemployment spells
started at approximately the same time, captures only regional variationU˙1
in unemployment rates. However, since the timing of reemployment spells
across individuals in the sample may differ, will capture both temporalU˙2
and regional variation in local labor market conditions.
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